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11IE INTERNATIONALISATION /CONVERTIBILITY
OF THE NAIRA•
BY
N.L OGRE
DlltECTOR OI' RESEAllCII, CENTRAL BANK OF
NIGERIA

The

paper

1xamined

issues

relating

to

the domestic aector soch u .sav.inp, .invesuneua, t!IC.,
coonomic planners often trace the time pathi ,of suc.b balaace
of payments aggregatie as imports, eJ.po,ts, capital now..
debt service and raerve movemems within a plan
fnmewort. The V·ohnc of these !titler variables dependa on
a number of causative facton, not le.ut being (he qUllliq of
the means of payment for international tnnsacdom.
Thus, ceteris pan.bu, the volume of tnde t.mda 10 be
boosted for a courrtry whose .ourrency is &eely and directly
exchangeable with those of other OOW'ltries. ·the same
tendcocy for substantial increases eililB for capital Oows
across countries, because of the facilitating effecta of
currency convertibility. l t is lhus l.Htl,e wonder that ooooomic
planners iD dynamic enviroruneats of developing coulllries
such as Nigeria, where c~ncies are Docused and largely
inconvertible, do often pre-occupy themselva with
perspective policy simulations on variables in the exlemll
sector, under scelJBrios based on asu.med degrees of
convertibility of the local currency. Such variables include
trade aad other current account aggregates that uc re.levwu
for planning in the me.dium to .long-,ten:n.
The purpose of this paper is to cliscu:ss is:sues pertaining
to the internati6nalisation of d'l.e naira, a term which is
synonymous widi convertibility of the naira, review ilhe
evolution of currency conv,ertibility, :.od the implications of
this for the economies of such countries wida oonvenible
currencies. The p.aper delineates ,efforts made so far .in the
West African sub-region to achieve currency .conv,ertibility
in the ECOWAS countri•es. H sub5equently artiwllates tbe
possibilities anCI proffers strate.gies for internationalising th~
naira completely independent of the .ECOW AS oommon
currency approach.
The discussion i.s organised inw six paru, for ease of
presentation. Part I dwells on issues of definition ofc.oncepts
and the pre-conditions for currency convertibility. Pan II
provides a review of the evolutioo of currency -convertibility
including lhe dynamics of their convertibility status, while
Part III focuses on the co.irrent efforts of ECOW AS aimed
at establishing a co,111.Yenible common currency for the .S11lbregion, highlighting the atlendant problems and unresol¥ed
issues. Part IV outlines trends in Nigeria"s exchange ,control
payments restrictions and naira comvertibility. Part V conwns

the

ilWmatitlnaJtsation ofthe Naira, a term which i8 S)'PIOft)fflO"
with convertibility. It statd that a cwrency is dttm«I
convertibk wltere there are no restrictions imposed on
pay,nmll and trrllllfen for CWTOII intemotional transaction.r.

It also ltighllghltd the imporlaltCe of convertibility to an

economy. 17,e pre-condinsn.s j:,r convertibiUty were identified
to inclwu the existence of a r&Jlistic MChange rote Ulllkr
o free intemalional trade and paylllffltS regime, the
availability of adequate foreign reserves, maintenance of
internal balance, aJtd the operation ofsimilar uchange raJe
regimes by the country's major trading partners. 77,e
evolution of cu"ency convertibility on a global basis as well
as the efforts to establish co,n,ertible currencies in rise West
African sub-region wire revi~. 77,e aperiences under
the gold standard, IM gold achange srandard, the Brenon
Woodr A"angmrenJ and the cw"e"' .floating rates regime
showed clearly the difficulty of achieving and sustaining full
currency convertibillty. 771is difficulty KW also monifest in
the experie11ce of the West African sub-region in the joint
effon to solve the problem of cu"ency convertibility among
ECO WAS coMNries through the eslablis~nt of a common
new cu"mry within an ECO WAS monetary wne. The paper
then went on to propMe WNJl it considered to be a more
viable altemotive WMreby Nigeria ht1f to mulce the naira
convertible through her own independent efforts. The cu"ent
economic setting in which liberalized exchange and trade
policies are being pursued through the Srructural Adjustment
Progf'tllNM was cOMidered to have suc(eeded in p,ming the
Naira on track tOWtJrds convertibility. The paper pointed out,
however, that several of lite necesmry conditions for the
establish~nt of a conl'ertible cu"ency are yet to be fa/filled
in the Ni8erian case. In concliuion, it expressed the hope
that within the perspective planning horiu,n of 15-20 years,
the noira has a good chance of artaining convertibility
particulnrly if the current po/jcies are sustained.

1

Introduction
An important objective of planning for any economy is the

achievement of a viable external sector in an effort to maintain equilibrium in the domestic sector. This underscores the
mutually interdependent nature of both sectors in economic
growth and development. Developments in the sectors are
Wiually manifested in a natioo •s balance of payments position.
Besides making proJ.:c1ions on macro-economi.: variable~ in

• Being che tut ofa lecnt,e presentl'.ld at tlic J';a11nnal Work ,hup on the Role
of the Financial Sector in Perspective Planning for Nigeria. at the Na.-1
A$S.embl)' Complex. Lagos.
· ·
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a consideration of the possibility and desirability of a
convenible Nigerian currency, independent of the ECOWAS

monetary zone experiment. Pan VI 1.ummariJ.CS and
concludes the paper.

PART I: THE CONCEPTS OF CONVERTIBILITY
not he seriously 0111 of line with the cost and price level of
its trading pannen, at least for commodities and services
that enter into international trade.

The concept of internationalisation of a currency can, for
all intents and purposes. be deemed to be synonymous with
the more familiar concept of currency convenibility. Full
currency convenibility has been defined as the unrestricted
exchange of the currency of a eountry into all other currencies
without any limitations being imposed on the usability of the
currency. Thus full currency converubility implies complete
. ah5eoce of foreign payments restrictions, whether on current
__2! ~tal ~-~tiona) transactions.
In actual practice oo such aboohlllo or full coovcrtibility
oow c:tiell. This is becau.e even in lhe ecooomically
advanced countriel wboc ~ .,.., said to be
cooveniblc. rewiction, ue •till placed on capital trangfen
or transactions. Thus, a currency is deemed conveniblc
where there ue DO re81Ji~ impo&ed on peymenls and

tranlfcn for current international transactions.

(b) Adequate RI I • •
It is imponant Iha! the COllll!r}' 0llllCerlled lilllald i...
IIUflicieot rcoerveo coverina tnaal lDOlllhl inlpolll
it to withstand the maim, of pouible deflclla for a pmod•
How much is adequai,e for Ibis pwpooe woulcl b-, ,._.., armt
on such factors .. the country's capacity IO, ralae beip
IO!llls, the fluctualiooi in the balance of peymailS pu11y
discernible from pest trends, structu,al change• affecting
cost-price relations arising from d'iffereoce.1 in export and
impon and the deslabili•in,g effects of speculation. The need
for the country to have adequate reserves 10 meet obliptions
of convertibility can therefore not be ovcremphuized.
Moreover, it i• very ne,;esSiry DOI only lhlil the counuy
possesses relatively large and sustained capecily IO earn
foreign exchange ~t aloo • diversified export bue.

ID...._

The

defirutioo implies that restrictions on capital transfers arc
permitted and conoistent with cooverubility. This narrower
coocqx i• the one adopted by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
However, when UNCTADopplied the concept of limited
convcrubility to ECOWAS currencies, the cooccpt, though
rendered more operational, loses that rigour, appearing ICM
ffillrictivc than it connote, under the IMF definition above.
The UNCTAD concq,t of limited convertibility of ECOW AS
currcncie5 may be definod as••• oel of co-ordinated national
exchange .,,aagat.,uts undeffakco by thooe ECOW AS
countriea to provide for a programme of futcr libcraliMllon
for iDl!er-regiooal peymoot• than in respect of parn-s to
the reat of the world" For an initial period preferential
li1'craliution of ;..,-regional peymcnu does ooc neceaarily
lwed lO cover all intra-ECOW AS transactions but may be
ratrided IO intra-<:01111Dunity trade which ii cliJiblc for
p.ebaltial tteauucrit oo lhc buii of the approved ECOW AS

(c)

A major precoodition ID oonvertibility i, the correctio11, of
balance of peymenll woequilibri11111 and the punult of policieo
to sustain the equ.ilibrium, The more, conveniblc • c11rrcncy
is the let11 re•lrictlve a,e impediments to external economic
transactions. Full converubility usumea tha1 trade and
payments restrictions ue non-existent.

IIENEJl'ITS OF CUllRENCY CONVERTIBILITY
(a) Allllty lo EJ:pud Trade ID IIM Loo& Run
1be more con,•eflil:>le a currency is the more the ocope IO
expand trading activities beyond traditional frontiers to ome,areas hitheno unexploited, The increased trading opportunitie• wiU result in increased production, diversificatioa
of the cxpon blise and an upward movement in intra-regional
trade.

tnde libenlilatioo proaramme.

PllE-CONDmONS FOil CONVERTIBILITY
TI>ere are several condltion• whose existence underlie the
succe.sful "'1ahllahmenl of • converublc currency. lbe8e
relate to the exisience of a realistic exchange rate unde, a
free international trade and paymenu regime, the availability
of adequate foreign exchange reserves, maintenance of
intern&l balance, and the operation of similar exchange rate
regime by the country's major trading partners.
(a)

Malnlenanu of mkm.,,I, Beleec-e

(b) lncreued Inv-at Inno..
As a result of trade liberalis»tion and a more efficient

allocation of resol!lrces, investon-. wm be encouraged lO inveM
in the economy. The perception of the area .. a potential
market and the fact that returns on investment could be
repatriated without being subject to restrictions, make the
economy attractive to foreig,n investors. lncreased1 dlirect
investment would also help to )ncrease the ~ t i c

R.N&tlc EJ.ch•ng• Rate

production of goods and services needed in the econo,py.

Under a free international trade and payments regime,
which is what currency convenibility implies, the exchange
rate operating in the country should reflect the strength of
inflows and outflows of foreign exchange. The rate of
""change would be such that makes the balance of payments
tend towards equilibrium. This will be the case when the
earnings from exports plus net capital inflow are at least
equivalent to what is necessary IO cover the import bills. At
the realistic rate of exchange under which a currency is
convertible, the cost and price level in the country should

(c)

A More Jl.ati@ruil !>"d Efflden! Allocation of
Resources

Since foreign investors are more Likely to invest iin areas
with very high returns. i»vestible funds would be more
rationally and efficiently allocated. Also, the fact that the
exchange rate must have been set a,l a near optimum lcveli
to achieve convenibility means that m11ke1 forcea wou,ld be
crucbtl in detenninililg investment decisions.
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(d)

currencies. Probably the most significant of the disadvan&ages
or constraints is the reduction in policy options available to
the government of the country to deal with serious balance
of payments development because it can no longer impose
payments and other direct restrictions on current transactions.
Another disadvantage is the heavy responsibility which
convenibility forces on government to ensure that it maintains
at all times adequate foreign exchange reserves so as IO be
able lo meet demand. This type of obligation is usually not
possible for countries to meet, especially those in the Third
World that do not have a diversified export base.
Another constraint especially for a developing country that
seeks to make its currency convenible is the inflationary
pressure that may follow the removal of restriction and
depreciation of the currency at the initial stages of
convertibility.

Panllel Market

In countries with convenible currencies, unofficial or
parallel markets for foreign currencies are not significant nor
widespread. Market mechanism allocates available foreign
exchange and there are hardly unsatisfied demands from
official sources so strong as to warrant a recourse to parallel
markets. Smuggling of goods tends to be minimised under
convertible currency regimes.

Disadvantages of Currency Connrtibility
Although convenibility of currency confers tremendous
advantages, as enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. it
also imposes costs or constraints on the country wilh
convertible currency. The constraints probably explain why
only few countries in the world maintain convertible

PART II: EVOLUTION OF CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY
From the very early times govennents have rc:oognised the
importance of currency convertibility and free trade regimes.
Hence, efforts were made to establish international trade
systems that were free from government restrictions
especially from the later pa" of the 19th Century. This was
the aim behind the evolution and or the establishment of
systems such as the gold standard, gold exchange standard,
Bretton Wood system, etc.

actions of the authorities on domestic policies. Any such
action, desirable as it could be, was inconsistent with the
commitment to the rules of the gold standard.

The Gold Exchange Standard
With the collapse of the gold standard at the out break of
World War I only the US dollar was fully convertible into
gold. This left a vacuum characterised by freely nuctuating
exchange rates and exchange controls. The golCI standard was
restored in the l 920s, but only in a modified form of a xold
exchange standard. Under the gold exchange standard, more
national currencies were fixed in terms of gold and the
currencies became "Key" currencies to which other
currencies were tie.cl and in tenns of which international
reserves were in pan kept. Even so, it was the US dollar
that remained fully convertible: at the exchange rate of $35
to an ounce of gold.
Soon there followed a scramble by each country to protect
its currency and trade vis-a-vis other countries. Competitive
depredations to promote exports and curb imports,
inconvertible currencies, exchange control and bilateralism
became the order of the day. The Great Depression,
heightene.d by massive flows of speculative capital, forced
the collapse of the gold exchange system in the early 1930s
as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and
other countries abandoned the system.

The Gold Standard
A country is on the gold standard when its basic monetary
unit (dollar, pound sterling, franc, etc.) is defined in terms
of a specified weight of gold and when its monetary
authorities stand ready at all times to buy and sell gold in
unlimite.d quantities at the rate fixed by the legal gold content
of the monetary unit. Thus, under a true international gold
standard the monetary unit is expected to possess the attribute
of absolute or full convertibility.
The gold standard .feature.cl prominently in the later part
of the 19th century through World War I. Under the system
adjustment placed primary emphasis on price changes. A
country in balance of payments deficit would expon gold in
settlement of its indebtedness. As a result, money supply
would decline in the deficit country and the pnce level would
de.cline correspondingly. On the other hand, a country in
surplus payments position receive.cl gold which raised money
supply and the price level correspondingly. The increase in
price encouraged imports until eventually equilibrium was
restored in both the deficit and surplus countries.
The dominating characteristics of the gold standard was
stability of ex.change rates within very narrow margins
produced by market forces without the intervention of th.e
monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market.
Besides, countries on the gold st.andard experienced growth
in international trade although such trade was limited by the
availability of gold. However, the major drawback of the
system, which accounted largely for its collapse in the
1930s, was that the operation of the automatic adjustment
mechanism through import and expo" of gold by surplus and
deficit countries, respectively, precluded discretionary

The Bretton Woods System
The Bretton Woods Sy~ or the "adjustable peg" system
was the decisive outcome of the meeting of representatives
of 44 countries which met in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, U.S.A., in July, 1944 in response to the need
to evolve a mechanism that would correct the obvious
weaknesses of the r,old standard and its variant, the gold
exchange standard. Under the system, exchange rates were
kept stable (that is, .. pegged") around declared par values
but were subject to re-pegging at different levels only upon
the emergence of fundamental disequilibrium in the country's
balance of payments.
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The adjustable peg system was designed to promote
exchange stability, growth of world trade, and forbid member
countties to restrict paymencs on current account transactions
or to discriminate in their currency practices without the
approval of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Controls
over capital movements, however, were permissible under
the system.
'The system was soon found to be inherently unstable. It
depended for effectiveness on maintenance of adequate
amounts of international reserves. But in the wake of s)ow
growth or outright decline of U.S. gold reserves the financing
of world trade became increasingly problematic with fixed
or stable exchange rates and a commitment to international
payments free of controls. Growth in international liquidity,
in circumstances of declining reserves of monetary gold, had
to depend on maintenance by the United States of America
ofbalance of payments deficits and the increasing acceptance
of the US dollar by other countries as an international reserve
asset. The system then critically hinged on the willingness
of the US to continue to run deficits. This soon led to loss
of confidence in the US dollar and some countries resorted
to converting their dollar holdings in.to gold. By 1971 the
U.S. gold reserves had declined to a critical level and there
were massive speculative outflows of short-term capital from
the country. Consequently, by August 15 of the same year

the United States suspended convenibility of the dollar into
gold. The suspension thus signalled the breakdown of the
Brellon Woods system.
Emergence

or Floating Rates

With the collapse of convertibility arrangements, most of
the major foreign currencies of the world were left to float
vis-a-vis the dollar. Some countries favoured .. de.an" float
which means floating without official intervention in the
foreign exchange marke~; other countries maintained the socalled "dirty" flm;t in which emerging exchange rates in the
market reflected government intervention. There were still
other countries which pegged their currencies to other
currencies or to a composite of currencies.
It is thus obvious from the above narrative that the origins
of the present definition of convertibility were rooted in the
Brenon Woods era. In that era the full convenibility status
which the dollar attained in the period of the gold standard,
1870 to 1914, and its extension in the form of the gold
exchange standard up to the 1930 s soon got eroded. The
permission given to countries, under the IMF Anicles of
Agreement, to impose restrictions on capital movements is
a reflection of that erosion.

PART lli: EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES IN WEST AFRICA
In various parts of the world effons have been made to
arrange monetary co-operation, trade liberalisation and
currency convertibility. We will only mention here briefly
such effons within the West African sub-region.

to the French Franc and equals 0.02 of the French Franc,
or 50 CFA to one French Franc.
(b) The bank pools the extemal reserves of all the
panicipating countries. The reserves are held exclusively in
the form of French Franc.
(c) The Bank maintains an account, called Operating
Account, with the French Treasury. Payments and receipts
in foreign exchange of the BC'EAO are settled through this
account. This system is sustained through a guarantee by
France to conven an unlimited amount of the CFA Franc
into French Franc. It is through this guarantee that the CFA
Franc acquires convertibility outside the UMOA countries.
(d) The Bank sets comprehensive targets for the monetary
aggregates to be maintained in member countries. Each
country makes projections for the growth of the economy,
the expected inflation rate, and the external sector position
in the coming year. The budge.tary financing requirements
for the country are also projected. 'These projections are made
in October of every year by the National Credit Committee
of each member state and forwarded to the Bank to enable
it determine the appropriate monetary targets for the entire
Union and for each member Sta.le.
(e) The Bank:, however, requires the agreement among
member s,111tes in making changes in interest and exchange
rate policies.

(I) Currency Arrangement Among the French-Speaking
West African Countries - The UMOA Countries
On 12th May, 1961, a financial and monetary co-operation
agreement was concluded between France and the Frenchspeaking a:,untries of West Africa. Under the agreement, the
countries comprising Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania,
Senegal, Upper Volta (now Bourkina Fasso), Mali and Togo
were to form a monetary union, namely, the West African
Mooe1ary Union (Union Monetaire l'OueJt Africaine
-UMOA) 2
'The powers of the former la Banque Centrale des £tats
tk l'A.frique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), which was established
to issue currency notes and act as bank of last reson to the
French-Speaking countries, were strengthened. The Bank's
functions now include:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

issue of currency OO!eS, namely the CFA Franc;
hannonization of the credit policy of member states;
IIWllll!ement of a common pool of external reserves
of the member states; and
taking into account both the domestic and
international money market situation and the need
to minimize capital flight.

(II) ECOWAS Commoo Currency
,In an effon to overcome the problems of inconvertible
currencies and trade and payments restriction• in the West
African sub-region, the countries of the sub-region having
come together under Economic Community of West African

Opendaa: 1be operation of the BCE.AO can be
sylllematically staled as follows:
(a) Under the agreement with Prance, the CFA Franc is fixed
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Slates (ECO WAS) have laken some imponant steps towards
having monetary union with a common currency that would
be freely used within the sub-region and made convenible
outside the sub-region. Such an arrangement is deemed
necessary lo promo(e much faster growth of intra-and interregional trade and, thereby, faster economic development
in the ECOW AS sub-region. Pursuant lo this objective, the
Authority of the Heads of State and Government of
ECOW AS took a decision that studies be commissioned on
the possibility of creating a single monetary zone in
ECOWAS sub-region. A study group was set up in
September 1983.
The final report of the Srudy Group in April 1987 proposed
a monetary zone of the West African Monetary Union
(WAMU) type for ECOWAS. It proposed a transitional
period of five years (1988 - 1992) before the single
ECOWAS Monetary zone could be created. In that period,
some non-member countries of the L 'Union Monetaire Oue.st
Africaine (UMOA), including Nigeria, are required to adopt
specific corrective policy measures designed to remove
sowces of disharmony arising particularly from exchange
rate and monetary and fiscal policies of the government. The
implementation of the adjustment measures by the nonmembers of UMOA is expected to achieve a harmonization
of their policies with those that obtain among the seven
member French-Speaking countries nf the UMOA.
The monetary zone envisaged is based on the common
currency model with the following characteristics:

States and Governments at its Tenth Ordinary Session held
at Abuja from July 7-9. 1987. It decided, however, that the
creation of a single monetary zone should be on a gradual
and pragmatic basis.
Considerable strides have been taken by member states of
ECOW AS in the bid to remove some of the disharmonies,
especially with regard to ex.change rates and intra-regional
trade. This has been made possible through the aegis of the
Structural Adjustment Programme currently being
implemented by most-member states of ECOW AS. Most of
the initial exchange rate adjustment recommended under the
EC0W AS Monetary Co-operation ·Programme have since
been met under the floating exchange rates arrangements
adopted by various countries of ECOWAS. The exchange
rate disharmonies in fonn of high degrees of overvaJuation
that featured in ECOWAS currencies other than the CFA
Franc, prior to the adoption of the Monetary Co-operation
Programme in 1987, have largely been removed.
It will be recalled that a multilateral institutional
arrangement established for the purpose of achieving limited
convenibility of ECOWAS currencies is the West African
Clearing House (WACH). To give practical content to this
objective, the WACH works lo facilitate, among other things,
increased use of national currencies to settle inua-ECOWAS ·
transactions and promote trade. However, most of the
problems impeding co-operation effons reside here.
Regretably, uansactions that go through the clearing
mechanism have been declining and the levels of
compensable trade have also been quite low. The low levels
of compensation mean that exports to member states do not
compensate their impons and vice-versa, so that less and less
use is made of national currencies to settle intra-ECOW AS
Trade as settlement of the uade imbalance has had to be made
in convertible, non-regional currencies.
Other problems have been the existence of stringent
exchange control measures in some member countries and
instability of members' exchange rates, which has created
a disincentive for exporters to invoice their products in their
local currencies whose values are falling steeply in terms of
major world currencies. Problems of transportation and
communication loom large, coupled with large-scale
ignorance of the role and functions of WACH among group,
especially bankers.

a common central bank;
a common convertible currency to replace existing
national currencies;
(iii) pooled external reserves;
(iv) the centralisation of shon-term domestic and external
liabilities of national central banks in the common
central bank;
(v) the re-designation of ex.isling national central banks as
branches of the sub-regional central bank; and
(vi) a convertibility guarantee agreement with the issuer
of a major international currency in order lo ensure
stability and international confidence in the new
(i)
(ii)

common currency.
The

proposed

ECOW AS

Monetary

Co-operation

Programme was adopted by the Authority of the Heads of

PART IV: NIGERIA'S EXCHANGE CONTROL, PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONS

AND NAIRA CONVERTIBILITY
Soon after the attainment of political independence in 1960,
Nigeria inaugurated a regime of exchange conuols. The
controls aimed at ameliorating the nation's balance of
payments problems through measures designed, among
odien, lo regulale the purchase and sale of foreign currencies
1111d maximise the use of available foreign exchange and
accommodate only essential imports of goods and services.
Ahbougb Ille measures did aclueve IIOIDe of the objectives
at the time, they however, reduced Ille usability and thus
increased the inconvenibility of the Nigerian currency.

Nigeria's exchange control system was based largely on
the Exchange Control Act, 1962 which replaced the
Exchange Control Ordinance of 1950. The Act, among other
things, prohibited all payments outside Nigeria by Nigerian
residents unless with prior approval of exchange control
authorities. It also enshrined the surrender requirement under
which proceeds from Nigerian exports should be repatriated
to the country and surrendered to the exchange control
authorities within three month,, from the date of expons.
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industrial production to a satisfactory level. The naira wa5
then generally believed to be over-valued in both nominal
and real terms against the US dollar and other major world

However, whereas the Act was applied liberally up to mid1967, tight foreign exchange control measures were applied
during 1967-1971. the period of Nigeria's civil war. In
that period the Nigerian currency became increasingly
inconvenible. The salient features of the control measures
in the period included the al1ocation of foreign exchange on
priority basis, accumulation of short-tem1 liabilities in the
form of approved applications for which foreign exchange
was not allocated, introduction of 90 and 180-day system
of payments for imports, the imposition of specific impon
licence and the introduction of foreign exchange budgeting
in an attempt to relate aggregate foreign exchange
expenditure to earnings.
The Nigerian currency recorded remarkable gains in
convenibility in the era of liberal exchange control
regulations - April I 972 to March 1977 and April 1980
-November 1981, and especially in the period of the oil
boom, 1974-76, when Nigeria had surfeit of earnings of
petro-dollars. The balance of payments position was strong
and the level of external reserves was relatively comfortable.
Indeed, the period saw the naira being used freely as a
transactions currency in some neighbouring countries of the
West African sub-region.
But the bouyant economic situation soon fizzled out in the
wake of the glut in the intemaional oil market. The Exchange
Control (Anti-sabotage) Decree, I 977, designed to strengthen
the Exchange Control Act of 1962, soon proved ineffective
as well;to arrest the drain on the nation's external reserves
in 198 I. Therefore the Economic Stabilisation (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1982 was passed to further tighten the noose
on exchange controls, accompanied by other controls such
as fiscal measures and impon licensing, thus again impaning

currencies. Such over valuation of the naira was one of the

price distortions and disequilibrium in the economy which
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in
July 1986, sought to correct.
Under the Structural Adjustment Programme exchange
control on current transactions and import licensing were
abolished. A second-tier foreign exchange market where the
naira exchange rate was to be determined by market forces
was established. A step was taken funher in deregulating the
foreign exchange market in July I 987 when the first and
second tier markets were merged and deregulated. Another

deregulatory measure la.ken in this regard was the abolition
of the regulation which required exporters of non-oil ex pons
to surrender the proceeds to the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Effective from January 1987, such exporters were allowed
to retain I 00 per cent of their export proceeds which,
however. must be placed in domiciliary account with a bank

in Nigeria. The owner of such an account can withdraw from
the account any time to pay for eligible transactions.

Moreover, in pursuit of the deregulation policy under the
SAP, the number of banned impon items was reduced from
74 to 16.
Thus, since September 1986 the naira has acquired
considerable degree of convertibility. However, the naira

cannot correctly be described as a convertible currency. This
is because the preconditions for the convertibility of a
currency have not been fully met. For instance, because of
the inadequacy and precariousness of the external reserves,
there are still some elements of exchange control even for
current transactions. Foreign exchange is still being rationed
while the parallel market looms large in the system.
Considered against the background of the high rate of price

on the then overvalued naira a substantial dose of
inconvenibility.
Severe balance of payments pressure which surfaced in

inflation, speculative activity, and the huge unsatisfied
demand for foreign exchange, the naira exchange rate is
probably still not quite realistic, but much nearer the realistic
level now than before the SAP.

1982 won;ened through 1985 as a result of increased debt
service burden and accumulated trade arrears. Furthermore,
there was acute shortage of inputs necessary to sustain

PART V: POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF NAIRA CONVERTIBILITY
collapsed. In spite of government effons to revive and
strengthen the economy by adopting the Structural
Adjustment Programme since 1986 and the significant
achievement under the programme so far, the economy today
is, no doubt, still depressed. Moreover, the economy still
reLies critically on a single commodity (petroleum) for foreign
exchange earnings and therefore lacks a diversified expon
base.

It is generally agreed that since the introduction of the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the middle of
1986, the naira has acquired a considerable degree of
convenibility. The liberalised trade and exchange regimes
have no doubt moved the currency forward on the path that
could lead to its convenibility, at least, in the long-run.
However, there are several conditions which are
prerequisites for the convenibility of a currency that are
absent in Nigeria's present economic environment. These
include a strong economy with a diversified expon base,
adequate extemaJ reserves relative to demand, realistic
exchange rate, free trade and exchange policy, etc. These
are discussed briefly below.

External Reserves
The external reserves of the country are far from being
adequate. For instance, from 1981 to th.e first five months
of 1989 the country's external reserves were much below
the minimum international convention for reserve adequacy.
Whereas the intemationaJ convention requires a minimum
of four months of imports, our reserves in 1981-1988 could
only finance an average of 1.8 months of imports and 2.9

F.conomlcStrength
1be Nigerian economy has been experiencing a serious
depression since 1981 when the international oil market
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efforu now being made to set up bureaux de change all over
the country are another major step towards further
deregulation of the exchange market.

months in the first five months of 1989 (see Table below).

EXTERNAL RESERVES AND MONTHS OF
IMPORTS THEY FINANCE

Al't'rag~
Monlhly
lmporr
($) Million
1981
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989•

2203.6
977.0
628.l
442.7
458.5
386.7

Res~rv~t
($) Million

Impllcatlons
(i) Coats
It was mentioned somewhere in Part I that a prominent
cost involved in currency convertibility is the reduction of
policy options available to government to deal with a serioua
adverse balance of payments development. 'The government
can no longer impose dim:t oontrols such as exchange control
or import licensing, nor directly manipulate the exchange
rate. It could, however, still intervene indirectly by taking
monetary and fiscal policy measures which are generally alow
in having the desired impact.

No. of
Monsh.r of
/mporrs

3807.2
1641.8
1081.6
1121.2
611.4
1116.4

1.7
1.7
1.7
2.5
1.3
2.9

(ii) Beneftll

The benefits a country could derive from the convertibility
of its currency are quite obvious. They have been discuaaed
in Part I. They will only be mentioned here briefly for
purpose of emphasis. Foremost among the benefits is tile
potential for trade expansion. The more convertible the naira
is, the more the scope Ill expand trading activities between
Nigeria and other countries. The increased trading activities
will resull in increaaed production, diversification of the
export baae and exparuion in intra-regional trade.
As a result of trade liberalisation and a more efficient
allocation of reaources, investors will be encouraged to Invest
in the economy. The perception of the area as a potential
market and the fact that returns on Investment could be
repatriated without being subject to restrictions, make the
economy attnctive to forei1111 investors. Increued dim:t
investment would al10 help to increase the domestic
production of goods and services needed in the economy.
In countries with convertible currencies, W10fficial matkels
for foreign currencies are not significant nor widespread.
Market mechaniam allocates available foreign exchange and
there are hardly unsatisfied demands from official sources
to warrant a recourse to parallel markets. Smuggling of
agricultural and manufactured goods tends to be minimised
under convertible currency regimes. Aloo, capital inflow
tends to be boosted through the maximisation of deaired
investrne.nt and output.
The analysis thus far indicates clearly that making the naira
a convertible currency is not only desirable but is also
consistent with the current policy stance of government.
However, the analysis also does indicate that fonmdable
problems loom large on the paths to the internationalisation
of the currency. These include the under-<leveloprnent and the
current depression in the Nigerian economy as well as the
structure of the economy which lacks a diversified expon
base. Others are inadequate external reserves, the persistent
balance of payments problems, 11 well as the persistent high
rate of inflation. Until these problems are solved, the naira
cannot become a convertible currency.

• January to May 1989
The fact that foreign exchange is being rationed today is

another te1ti111011y to its inadequacy relati"e to demand.
Moreover, becau•e of the continued glut in the international
oil market, our balance of payments is persistently under
heavy preeaure•, making the achievement of equilibrium
extremely difficult. The problems of the external sector will
persill until the export base is diversified.
Fne Trade Polley
Wjth the abolition of exchanae control and import licensing
and Olher restrictions on trade under the SAP a major step
had been taken towards naira convertibility. However,
bec:auae of the consideration for balance of payments, some
controls are still relained not only for capital transactions
but also for current transactions. For instance, foreign
exchange is •till being rationed while the u,e of funds in
domiciliary accounts is limited to eligible tr..naactions.

11.zdYI. . Rate Polley
Under the current exchan11e rate policy, the value of the
naira is determined by market forces of supply and demand.
The Central Bank of Nigeria calls for bids from authoriaed
dealen oo a daily basis and the available foreign exchange
is sold III them at the price determined at the auction. Nigeria
opera!el a managed floating exchanged rate regime under
which some form of government intervention in the
determination of exchange rate is adopted in order to ensure
its orderliness and stability. Such intervention has been
exerciaed occasionally through buying and selling of foreign
exchange in the market and through the adoption of
appropriate monetary and fiscal measures.
The floating of the naira has succeeded in removing its
over-valuation which marked it in the pre-SAP era. The
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PART VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The paper hu diacuucd the po11ibility of
intenWionali•tion/convcnibility of the nain1 wieb a view
to IMeelllll what the authoride1 ltill hive &o do in order to
make it convertible in the medium to Iona-term. The
condidona precedent to convertibility were identified u the
exittcDce of a rea.lia:lc exchanp rate determined throaaJI
amt« force• and free of diacredonlry manipulation by the
monemy authortdcl; a Uberaliled trade regime under which
restrictiotu . are di..Uowed on current international
tranMcdona; the mahMcnance of adequate foreign euhange
reserves supported by a diversified export base; 11.nd balance
of payments equilibrium.
The evoluti.Jn of currency convertibility on a global buiJ
u well a the efforta IO eatablilb convertible currenci~ in
the Weat African IMll>-region were reviewed. The review
dlOlrl 1he dHlk:ulty of acbievina and IUllaining full currency
convertibility. A new definition of conven.ibility which

(b)
(c)

2.

from other invecnenta;
paymeull of moderate UDDWIO for amortiDdon of
loam or for deprecildoo of dir.:t iovelUllclll&t;
modcrlte remiaanca for family IMaa e....-.

(d)
Mali whicll formerly wtthd~w from the &ar-meat wu
.....,,mined in 1984 while Mawi1uia abudoned tbe U8'aa
iD 1972. Tot0~totbDAIJ__.oa271hNo¥amel,
1963.

REl'ERENCl.8
l.

2.

permits the imposition of rcstrictioos on capital international
lnMKtions cn,eraed It the Breaoo Wooda arrangement. The
review allO show, that the convmibility of the CFA Franc
is IUllained mainly by the guarantee oflhc French authorities
while the achievement of the p r ~ common and
convertible currency for ECOWAS hu many difficult
burdlC6 to overcome before it is achieved, if ever it will be
achieved.
The alternative and perhaps more viable propo5ition is the
one whereby Nigeria hu to make the naira convertible
through independenf efforts. The approach is propitious since
the liberalised CJ.change and trade policies being currently
puni:ied by government through the Structural Adjustment
Propunme ha\ie succeeded in pulling me naira on track
towarda convertibility. However, several of the conditions
which arc .necessary for the establishment of a convertible
cunency are yet to be fulfilled in the Nigerian economy.
Theae include a stJ'On8 economy with diversified export base,
comfonable level of external reserves, realistic exchange
rate,
and
reasonable
price
stability.
The
internationalisation/convertibility of the naira will continue
to be severely limited iO long as these problems remain

~ . 0.1,. "Tbe R.Mevance of Exdlanae Coaad I.a
Nipria'1 8-a el Payam Adjulftnlu Procw'', C.mllal
Bak of Nipria, &atanlc oNI F'tnoM:iaJ Rni,w, Val. 21,
No. 3, Lap, Sepcembet, 1983.
Cicm-Saia A., So,dy on dv PouiblUry oNI ~ of
LJmit~d Conwrrtbtlity Armn1n,,e1,u for tfw UOJtt,
Geneva, September 1984, UNCTA.D Project RAP/77 /032:

3.

UNCT...0/ECDE/TA/18 O.E. 85 - 55'.m.
Cicin-S.in, A. IDd J. Manhall, Slw/y on UlfUt#d lill'l"fflC)'

Con11ertibdiry Amo"I ECOWAS Cot111trln, Oeneva,
UNCTAD/BCDC/142 Febnlary - M.n:b, 1993.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

urue.olved.

IO.

It is hoped, however, Chat within the perspective planning
horizon of say 15-20 years, the naira has a good chance of
acquirina most of the anributcs of a convertible currency,
cepcciilUy if lhe CUJ'ffN policy of liberalisaJion continues and
the objectives of the structural adjustment programme are
rwizcd.

11.

12 .

NO~
I.

Jlllyment.1 due • URl"Oll on loelll and • mt incolm

As spell out by the Fund 's Articles of Agreemen1. current
imcrn.atiooal t~ions include:
(a)
a.II payments due in connection with foreign trade and

13.

normal short-tenn banking and credit facilities;
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